

DCI/IC-77-0795
5 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
FROM : [REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the D/DCI/IC
SUBJECT : Proposed New Staff Structure to Support
the DCI

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1. Attached is a memorandum prepared as a follow-on to discussions you and Admiral Turner have had concerning possible means of strengthening the staff support provided him in his dual roles as head of the Intelligence Community and operating manager of the CIA.

2. This memorandum was drafted after discussion among [REDACTED] and myself. Mr. McMahon read the initial draft and expressed some concern about including the Office of Collection Guidance under the Deputy Director for Collection rather than under the Deputy Director for Analysis and Production. He also felt the Deputy Director for Administration was preferable to having this officer a subordinate to the Deputy Director for Resources and Management.

3. Since I assume you will be discussing this further with the DCI in person, I did not prepare a covering memorandum by which the attached paper would be forwarded to the Director.

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Attachment:
as stated

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SA-D/DCI/IC/

(5 May 1977)

AN ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE DCI IN EXECUTION OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES

PROBLEM

1. To enhance effectiveness of the DCI in execution of his responsibilities both as leader of the Intelligence Community and as operating head of the CIA by creation of an organizational structure that will improve support to the DCI in each of his primary areas of responsibility, bring the DCI span of control within readily manageable limits, and capitalize on the assets of both the CIA and the Intelligence Community. The organization should be such as can be put into effect without legislation, but still be sufficiently in consonance with present thinking in the Congress that Congressional acceptance could be expected.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

2. The restructuring of the CIA and Intelligence Community elements under direct DCI control as proposed herein does not contemplate any change in the present responsibilities of the DCI. He would continue to be:

- Senior U.S. intelligence officer and primary intelligence adviser to the President;
- Chairman of the NSC PRC(I);
- Operating head of the CIA;
- Responsible for the establishment of intelligence requirements and priorities;
- Responsible for the production of national intelligence;
- Responsible for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of national intelligence activities.

3. Four deputies would report directly to the DCI as "vice presidents" for his major areas of responsibility:

- Deputy Director for Collection

(Since the National Security Act of 1947 provides for but one Deputy DCI, the DDCI could be designated as Deputy Director for Collection and continue to represent the DCI in his absence. The other three Deputy Directors would each be Deputy to the DCI, pending amendment of the National Security Act of 1947.)

- Deputy Director for Analysis and Production
- Deputy Director for Resources and Management
- Deputy Director for Administration

4. Deputy Director for Collection

a. The DDC would have three deputies:

(1) Director of Clandestine Activities. This officer would be responsible for clandestine collection and would head the present CIA/DDO structure, less the Domestic Collection Division.

(2) Director of Overt Activities. This officer would be responsible for all overt collection activities under DCI control and for support to and interaction with elements of the Government outside the Intelligence Community that have a capability to collect foreign information of intelligence interest. This Directorate would include the Domestic Collection Division now in DDO, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service now in DDS&T, and the map and publication procurement activities now in DDI.

(3) Director of Collection Technology. This officer would head the present CIA DDS&T organization, less the FBIS.

b. The DDC also would have an Office of Collection Guidance and head of which would be responsible for the correlation of requirements and the optimum allocation of collection tasking. The chairmen of the five DCI collection committees--COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, Human Resources Committee, Critical Collection Problems Committee, and the [redacted] would report to the DCI through the chief of the Office of Collection Guidance and the Deputy Director for Collection. The permanent staff members of these committees would be assigned to the Office of Collection Guidance.

c. In the event the DCI should be assigned line management control of the National Security Agency and/or the national reconnaissance activities as a result of actions taken by the President in response to recommendations arising from the PRM-11 exercise, or of statutory action by the Congress, the heads of these activities would report to the DCI through the Deputy Director for Collection.

5. Deputy Director for Analysis and Production

This officer would be in charge of the production of all national intelligence and would be responsible to the DCI for the quality, timeliness and relevance of all national intelligence products. His organization would include the present NIO staff and the present CIA/DDI resources, probably restructured somewhat. The chairmen of the four DCI production committees--EIC, JAEIC, STIC and WSSIC--would report to the DCI through the Deputy Director for Analysis and Production.

6. Deputy Director for Resources and Management

This officer would head a directorate which includes the present Intelligence Community Staff (less the DCI collection committee staffs), the CIA Office of General Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, Office of Inspector General, Office of the Comptroller and the Assistant to the Director for Public Affairs. The Chairmen of the DCI support committees--Information Handling Committee, Security Committee, and Committee on Exchanges--would report to the DCI through the Deputy Director of Resources and Management.

(1) An alternative to this proposal would be to have the GC, LC, and IG and Public Affairs Assistant report directly to the DCI, but it is proposed these officers be a part of the Resources and Management Directorate and report to the Deputy Director for Resources and Management in the interest of maintaining a reasonably narrow DCI span of control.

(2) Another alternative would be to eliminate the post of Deputy Director for Administration and change the title to Director for Administration, who would be subordinate to the Deputy Director for Resources and Management.

(3) The present Intelligence Community Staff would become the Directorate for National Programs and would include, as at present, an Office of Policy and Planning, Office of Program and Budget Development, and Office of Performance Evaluation and Improvement. This latter office would be much smaller than at present since it would lose the staffs of the COMIREX, SIGINT Committee and Human Resources Committee.

(4) A question requiring particular study would be the extent to which the present ICS Office of Program and Budget Development and the CIA Office of the Comptroller could be amalgamated.

7. Deputy Director for Administration

Whether this officer is at the Deputy Director level or is the Director for Administration under the Deputy Director for Resources and Management, he would have the same organization as the present CIA/DDA. He would, however, be responsible for supporting the DCI in his Community responsibilities as well as his responsibilities as operating head of the CIA.

PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

8. The proposed organization is considered to have much going for it from the standpoint of improving arrangements for centralized management of the tasks for which the DCI is responsible, but it also presents a number of issues.

a. Other elements of the Intelligence Community, particularly Defense Department organizations, might look upon the organization as a marked enhancement of the CIA position in matters which are essentially Community in nature.

(1) In a sense this is a valid comment, because the DCI would, in effect, be eliminating any distinction between his Community role and his distinctly CIA role. He would have an organization which considers his responsibilities as an entity. On those matters which have Community import, such as production of national intelligence, he would be using CIA as a Community asset.

b. Some CIA officers might look upon such a new organization as a downgrading of the CIA in that the Agency would lose its separateness and hence its uniqueness.

(1) In actuality, the central nature and the national importance of the CIA would, overall be expanded. It would lose none of its present functions, and it would be melded more closely into support of the DCI in his Community responsibilities.

c. Supporters of the concept that CIA's effectiveness has stemmed in part from the fact that its Deputy Directors have operated what were in actuality separate fiefdoms, will be concerned that the new organization would end this situation.

(1) Much will depend upon the quality of the four Deputy Directors, but the proposed organization will provide a means of linking the DDO and DDS&T, in particular, more closely together.

d. Critics will charge that a reorganization to the extent called for by this proposed structure would be disruptive of ongoing activities.

(1) Change is in the wind. It seems clear from the tone of PRM-11 that the President is expecting proposals will be made to him on organizational and structural changes within the Intelligence Community. Bills already introduced in the House and the drafts thus far seen of legislation to be offered by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence call for more extensive changes than are offered in the proposal outlined in this paper.

e. The proposed staff structure for support of the DCI could exacerbate DoD concerns about "CIA dominance" in the manning of Community elements, e.g., all but three NIOs are CIA officers, 9 of 12 DCI committee chairmen are CIA officers, and CIA now provides a "disproportionate share" of the professional manning of the Intelligence Community Staff.

(1) There is no requirement that any of the top positions be occupied by CIA professionals. This is a matter for decision between the President and the DCI. Any or all of the Deputy Director posts could be filled by persons selected from outside the Intelligence Community. If DoD detailees now on board remain in their present assignments there would be Defense Department personnel serving under each of the Deputy Directors. By agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, Defense representation in the proposed structure could be markedly expanded if it is considered this would contribute to the effectiveness of the operation.

f. The proposed organization might not satisfy the House Appropriations Committee insistence that the Intelligence Community Staff must be absolutely independent of the CIA, even to the extent of being manned at least in part by personnel in an ICS career service.

(1) A deliberate effort would be required to convince the HAC that by establishing this staffing arrangement the DCI was including the CIA as part of his Community organization, and that in order to fulfill his responsibilities the DCI was required to use the CIA in a Community role. In its roles as producer of national intelligence and the provider of services of common concern the CIA already is part of the Community structure.

g. Those who consider that the DCI should be separated from CIA and not be its operating head may consider the proposed organization is inadequate because it does not provide a DCI independent from the CIA.

(1) The kinds of responsibilities now being discussed as proper for assignment to the senior U.S. intelligence officer (adviser to the President, responsible for budgeting and control of resource allocation for the entire Community, responsible for production of national intelligence, etc.) would require that this senior intelligence officer be supported by a large and versatile staff, probably not too unlike the organization being proposed in this paper to support the DCI.

h. Those who argue that the DCI cannot fulfill a true Community role so long as he is at the same time the operating head of the CIA might see in the proposed staff structure an opportunity for the CIA to subsume the DCI's Community responsibilities by absorbing them in a narrow "parochial" Agency approach to intelligence problems.

(1) The intent of the proposed staff support for the DCI is exactly the opposite. The staff structure is intended to diffuse and relax any possible dichotomy in the twin Community/Agency roles of the DCI by explicitly and directly involving all of his Deputy Directors in Community business. The CIA in considerable measure actually would become a Community activity.

CONCLUSIONS

9. The restructuring of the CIA and the Intelligence Community elements under direct DCI control as proposed in this paper would not pre-empt any recommendations expected to result from the PRM-11 exercise except for any possible recommendation that the senior U.S. intelligence officer cease to be also the operating head of the CIA. The proposal represents an approach that probably is acceptable to most elements of the Congress.

10. The proposed DCI staff structure would, in effect, go back to the basic intent of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and establish a central, i.e., "Community" role for the CIA.

11. It is a moderate rather than a "radical" solution to the problem of correlating the responsibilities and the authorities of the senior U.S. intelligence officer, and as such it warrants detailed exploration regardless of the direction taken in other aspects of the PRM-11 exercise.

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